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Abstract. This article investigates issues behind households’ tax payment morale, theoretical and practical aspects 
of the tax payment gap, and its impact on public sector revenue in Baltic countries. The attitude of households on tax 
payment is assessed quantitatively by employing a dichotomous logit-probit regression analysis. The tax payment 
gap among Baltic households has been investigated by applying a “macro approach,” the main components of which 
are the shadow economy and the total tax rate. The effect of any hypothetical changes in tax morale is assessed by 
applying social accounting matrixes, which are based on national account data and allow to keep the economy balanced 
at all time. The results presented in this research suggest that taxes uncollected from households constitute nearly 
one fifth of total general government revenues and count nearly one tenth of the nominal GDP. Measures applied to 
strengthening tax morale positively contribute to public sector revenue and in general to the economy, though they 
should be applied gradually. 
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Mokesčių moralė ir viešojo sektoriaus pajamos Baltijos šalyse 
Santrauka. Straipsnyje yra analizuojama aktuali daugeliui valstybių prastos mokesčių mokėtojų moralės ir dėl to 
atsirandančios mokesčių spragos problematika. Atsižvelgus į tai yra siūloma priemonių mokesčių moralei stiprinti ir 
pateikiamas netradicinis – nacionalinių sąskaitų pagrindu parengtų socialinės apskaitos matricų – metodas mokesčių 
moralės pokyčiams ir viešojo sektoriaus pajamoms įvertinti. Gyventojų mokesčių moralei reikšmingiausią įtaką daro 
tokie veiksniai korupcijos toleravimas, pasitikėjimas valdžia, nacionalinis pasididžiavimas ir religingumas. Apskritai 
atliktas tyrimas patvirtina ekonominės elgsenos svarbą vertinant mokesčių surinkimą. Kaip pavyzdys yra pasitelktos 
Baltijos šalys, kuriose mokesčių spragos problema yra itin aktuali.
Pagrindiniai žodžiai: mokesčių moralė, mokesčių spraga, viešojo sektoriaus pajamos, logistinė regresinė analizė, 
socialinės apskaitos matricos.
Introduction
The payment of taxes is an agreement among taxpayers and the state. Taxpayers commit 
to pay taxes, and the state provides public goods and security that otherwise would not be 
available in a market economy. However, the universal aversion to tax theory contradicts the 
previous statement in a way that every rational economic agent will tend to increase its well-
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being by reducing tax payments and seeking public benefits. Practical outcomes support this 
statement: 90% of public revenues are raised from tax contributions, but at the same time, 
uncollected taxes constitute nearly one fifth of all taxes. Therefore, attention to a practical 
and theoretical examination of the factors that have the most pronounced influence on tax 
payment is growing rapidly.
The background for the decision whether to pay taxes or not is based on a cost-benefit 
analysis. Usually, the two main indicators – tax base and tax rate – as it is shown in this re-
search, are unable fully and comprehensively explain changes in tax payments, suggesting 
the existence of other explanatory variables. This is the reason behind the growing attention 
to alternative factors, which could disclose unwillingness to pay taxes more accurately. Mo-
reover, an exploration of issues behind weak tax payment is vital for a number of countries, 
as changes in willingness to pay taxes may contribute considerably to state budget. The 
main drawback of tax morale researches is the lack of appropriate data sources. Usually, 
assessments in the field of tax evasion are based on data provided by surveys, experiments, 
or laboratory outcomes, because tax evasion, as well as the existence of a tax payment gap, 
is characterized by a criminal background. 
The aim of this research is to reveal factors affecting unwillingness to pay taxes and, by 
disclosing the magnitude of the tax payment gap among households, simulate the possible 
effects of tax morale changes on the public sector revenue. The analysis of tax morale is 
based on the data provided by World Values Survey and European Values Study. Data recei-
ved from these surveys are quantitatively assessed by employing dichotomous logit-probit 
regression models. The analysis of the tax payment gap is based on a “macro approach,” 
which is in turn based on national account data. National account data also have been used to 
create social accounting matrixes, which are a prominent instrument for consistent imitative 
simulations of the economy. 
Aside from the introduction and conclusions, this study is constituted of five main 
sections: the first discusses the importance of taxes in a contemporary economy, the second 
deals with the magnitude of tax evasion and the tax payment gap in Baltic countries, while 
the third presents the main factors comprising tax morale, discerned from the existing lite-
rature on the subject. In the fourth section of this research, a quantitative assessment of tax 
morale in Baltic countries is revealed together with the results. The fifth section provides 
background for the creation of social accounting matrixes and simulates the outcomes from 
possible changes in tax morale. 
The Economic Meaning of Taxation
Taxes affect the economy and the behavior of taxpayers in different ways. As Levine-Schay-
owitz (2005) states, when governments raise taxes, people alter their behaviors and make 
decisions they would not make otherwise. This suggests that when the behavior of private 
citizens is affected by a tax, the allocation of resources changes as well. Because taxes raise 
the prices buyers pay, providing incentives to consume less, and lower the prices sellers re-
ceive, providing incentives to produce less, the size of the market shrinks below its optimum 
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level in the sense that revenues raised by government taxation may be less than the outcomes 
of a distorted market. Changes in tax policies also affect decisions to participate in the labor 
market, the choice of occupation, tax avoidance schemes, and the degree of tax evasion ac-
tivities through participation in the formal or informal sector of the economy. 
Taxes constitute the main part of public sector revenues in modern economies. Usually, 
changes in tax collection determine whether the government is running a budget surplus or 
deficit. In the case the public sector has more revenues and savings than expenditures, pub-
lic spending toward consumption and investment increases without building up debt. This 
positively contributes to the general economy because public spending increases the ceteris 
paribus aggregate demand. If public expenditure remains higher for a longer period, the wid-
ening gap between revenues and expenditure needs to be covered using borrowed funds or a 
decrease in reserves (in case the country has reserves). Both outcomes are generally unwel-
come, because the growth of debt means an increasing debt burden for future generations and 
usually becomes a leading indicator for future tax increases, as proposed by the Ricardo-De 
Viti-Barro equivalence theorem. Thus, the decisions of economic agents whether to pay taxes 
or not have ultimately direct impact on them, as tax payment is directly linked to provision 
of public goods and services and the public sector’s indebtedness.
A budget deficit is a common issue for the public sector in the aftermath of financial or eco-
nomic crises. The main reason for this is the increase of public sector expenditures to support 
a faster economic recovery. J. M. Keynes presented such a view during the Great Depression. 
However, it could be added (Rutkauskas 2015) that public borrowing after an economic down-
turn is a consequence of the usually enormous building of private debt prior the bust. Greater 
flows of consumption and investment during the economic boom phase support faster growth 
and push the economy into a new, greater level. When an economic downturn begins, a drop 
in borrowing, and simultaneously in consumption and investment of the private sector, results 
in a much lower GDP level. The same level of funds is required to keep the economy close to 
its previous equilibrium; however, the private sector tends to save rather than consume more in 
bust periods (or they are forced to do so due to a lack of lending willingness by financial inter-
mediaries). The crucial role in terms of automatic stabilizers and general expenditure is played 
by the public sector, which behaves like a substitute for drops in private sector expenditure.
The main share of the general government’s revenues comes from taxes. Three taxation 
sources – a value-added tax, taxes on income, and wealth and social contributions – are the 
main ones. As this research investigates issues behind tax payment and tax morale only among 
households, it is important to clarify the households’ share in tax contributions. It is clear that 
income and wealth taxes, as well as social contributions (the majority of them), are paid by 
households. National accounts do not provide the final payers of value-added tax and puts it 
as a payment made by total national economy. However, value-added tax is recorded as being 
borne by purchasers, not sellers, and then only by those purchasers who are not able to deduct 
it. Thus, the greater part of this tax is recorded as being paid on final uses, mainly by house-
holds for their consumption (European Commission, 2013). Based on this, an assumption is 
presented in this research that all of the value-added tax has been paid solely by households. 
Thus, an investigation into the willingness to pay taxes should be concerned mainly with the 
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households’ behavior. Before assessing households’ tax morale, in the next section of this 
research, an estimation of the tax payment gap – an outcome of tax avoidance – is provided. 
Tax Payment Gap
Estimating and dissecting the difference between taxes due and collected (or simply the tax 
payment/compliance gap) is becoming more common but remains an exception, even in 
advanced economies. Measuring the tax payment gap depends on the data and resources 
available. Generally, two main approaches – the “bottom-up” and “top-down” – are used. 
The “bottom-up” approach is based on estimations made from audit results or other ope-
rational information. This way is rather costly but provides direct intelligence on the nature 
of non-compliance. As K. Raczkowski (2015) argues, this approach rests on selected control 
and audit methods within the representative group, which is subsequently generalized for 
the whole population surveyed. However, it should be kept in mind that audits ought to be 
limited in their scope but adequately targeted. Nevertheless, they cannot be the most cost-
effective form of research into the tax gap, yet they should rely on prospective analyses as 
part of the audit additionally carried out in the real time.
The “top-down” or “macro approach” uses national accounts and other data to model the 
tax base and estimate revenue under perfect compliance, subtracting actual collections to 
arrive at the tax payment gap. This has the advantage of using readily publicly available data, 
but its accuracy depends on the data used and may provide little insight into how compliance 
might be improved (IMF, 2015). K. Raczkowski (2015) adds that the “top-down” approach 
does not conduct physical controls on the taxpayer but relies on tax declarations and other 
data sources, which mostly allow for the determination of the tax gap in a less precise manner 
than physical audits. 
The first approach has been used mostly by tax authorities, as they possess data usu-
ally inaccessible for individual and external users. Thus, the second approach is more com-
mon, especially for making international comparisons, as it is the case of this research. K. 
Raczkowski (2015) has described one of the ways to employ a “top-down” or “macro” appro-
ach by measuring the tax payment gap (TPG). The author argues that a multiplication of three 
main components (1) can reveal the nominal amount of unpaid taxes, i.e., the total tax rate 
(TTR); the gross domestic product (in nominal terms; NGDP); and the size of the shadow 
economy (SE), where i represents the country, and n – the period. 
ܶܲܩ௡௜ ൌ ܴܶܶேூ כ ܵܧ௡௜ כ ܰܩܦ ௡ܲ௜  (1)
In his paper, K. Raczkowski (2015) takes the total tax rate as paid by businesses excluding 
such taxes as the personal income tax, value-added taxes, sales taxes, or goods and service 
taxes. However, the purpose of this research is to investigate tax morale and the compliance 
of households as they are the main taxpayers; thus, the total tax rate of businesses has been 
changed into implicit tax rates on income and consumption. The results of these calculations 
are presented in Table 1, and they reveal that in 2015, the tax payment gap in Baltic countries 
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comprised 2.1-3.5 billion euros, or nearly one tenth of the nominal GDP. As the size of the 
estimated shadow economy is nearly similar in Baltic countries, the main driving factor of 
the tax payment gap, based on the “top-down” approach, appears to be the tax rate: the higher 
the tax rate, the bigger the uncollected tax revenue for the government is estimated (see the 
case of Estonia). 
Table 1: A calculation of the tax payment gap (TPG) among the Baltic countries.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Estonia
TTR, % 57.8 54.8 60.6 61.3 61.0 60.1 59.2 60.2 60.6
SE, % of NGDP 17.8 19.4 24.6 23.0 19.7 18.3 18.0 17.5 18.5
TPG, % of NGDP 10.3 10.6 14.9 14.1 12.0 11.0 10.6 10.5 11.2
Latvia
TTR, % 49.3 46.5 48.1 51.5 53.1 53.5 52.6 52.3 51.6
SE, % of NGDP 17.0 18.3 21.2 20.4 18.7 17.3 16.7 15.9 16.6
TPG, % of NGDP 8.4 8.5 10.2 10.5 9.9 9.3 8.8 8.3 8.6
Lithuania
TTR, % 50.9 50.1 48.6 48.9 48.9 48.6 48.6 49.2 49.9
SE, % of NGDP 20.6 20.3 24.3 23.1 20.9 19.3 18.3 17.6 18.7
TPG, % of NGDP 10.5 10.2 11.8 11.3 10.2 9.4 8.9 8.7 9.3
Sources: Eurostat, Medina and Schneider (2018), and author’s calculations. 
The factors affecting public sector’s revenues in gathering and balancing the budget are 
important to securing the fulfillment of a contract among public and private sectors. Thus, 
the tax base, tax rates, and taxation systems in general are and will be under high interest 
in searching for the most efficient taxation model or policy that enables governments to 
maximize public revenues. The classical taxation model suggests looking at the taxpayer as 
a decision-maker with an aim to maximize benefit. Before paying taxes, an economic agent 
performs a cost and benefit analysis and looks for two possible options. One of them is not 
to pay taxes and to potentially pay a fine in the case of audit by a tax authority; the sec-
ond – to pay taxes. However, a number of unanswered questions remain. For instance, why 
do economic agents tend to pay taxes and why not? What are the main factors behind their 
decisions, and how could these factors be influenced? What role could the government play 
in all this? An increasing number of researchers are looking for ways to explain the so called 
“soft factors” – other than the tax base and rate – behind taxpayers’ behavior. 
Factors behind Tax Collection
In contemporary economic theory, the payment of taxes is a bilateral agreement between an 
economic agent and the state, because the latter is basically grounded on that way of funding. 
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Economic agents agree to pay taxes to the state, for public goods and security in return. At the 
same time, economic agents are rational benefit-seekers and will try to avoid or minimize tax 
payments and will simultaneously seek public goods and security. Samuelson (1954) argued 
that the private provision of public goods would be inefficiently low, because everyone would 
have an incentive to “free ride” on the private purchases of others. The theory of general re-
luctance to pay taxes also brings arguments that are contrary to the concept of a conscious tax-
payers’ agreement with the state. The fiscal illusion theory adds that a rational economic agent 
realizes the need to have a balanced level of public finance (the expenditures on public goods 
and security should not exceed the revenues of the state in the long run). Notwithstanding this, 
a rational economic agent tends to seek financial benefits from the state and not pay for public 
goods and services via taxes. Thus, such a behavior is assessed as irrational.
The public sector uses legal powers to force economic agents distribute part of their 
revenues via taxes. There are three possible ways to deal with taxation: (1) agree to pay 
taxes, (2) evade taxes, or (3) avoid taxes. An agreement to pay taxes is not under the aim of 
this research and thus will not be assessed further. Tax evasion and tax avoidance have at 
once similar and different meanings that must be clarified. According to the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, tax evasion is linked to illegal agreements among 
parties in order to conceal on taxes or elude the fulfillment of tax liabilities. Meanwhile, tax 
avoidance is linked to searching for legal abilities enabling to diminish tax payments (OECD, 
2015). For the purpose of this research, differences between tax evasion and tax avoidance 
are not that important, because the result of a general unwillingness to pay taxes, and not the 
type of it (evasion or avoidance), is under concern. Considering this, within the scope of this 
research, tax evasion and tax avoidance are taken as synonyms. 
M. Allingham and A. Sandmo presented the most famous income tax avoidance model 
in 1972. Their research was based on G. S. Becker’s Crime and Punishment: An Economic 
Approach. In this paper, G. S. Becker (1968) proposes to look at tax payment as an optimal 
portfolio formation exercise, where the taxpayer either chooses to take a risky path and not 
pay taxes but faces the probability of being audited by a tax authority or chooses the safe 
portfolio and pays taxes as it is stated by the law. S. Yitzhaki (1974) complemented the model 
with an instance of a fine in case the fact of tax evasion is detected. Such an approach allows 
investigating the sensitivity of taxpayer behavior to factors like probability to be audited, 
fines, the tax rate, etc. However, this model received some critique, which was acknowledged 
by its authors. The weakest point here is the assumption that the taxpayer benefits only by 
avoiding paying taxes, as the classical model does not consider the economic goods and 
services that are provided by the state. Thus, the only rational outcome in this case would 
be to avoid paying taxes and free-ride, as suggested by Samuelson (1954). This drawback 
is well-perceived by the authors; however, because of its simplicity, it is commonly used to 
explain the unwillingness to pay taxes. 
Why do people pay taxes, then? J. Alm et al. (1992) have raised this question, and the 
results of their experiment suggest that compliance occurs because some individuals over-
weight the low probability of audit, although such overweighting is not universal. Compli-
ance does not occur simply because individuals believe that evasion is wrong, since the sub-
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ject behavior is unchanged using either neutral or loaded terms. Moreover, there is evidence 
that individuals pay taxes because they value public goods that their taxes are funding. At 
this stage, it should be noted that individuals exhibit a remarkable diversity in behavior. They 
sometimes appear either to overweight low probabilities or to be risk-seeking; on occasion, 
they are either cooperative or act like free-riders (as could be presented form empirical find-
ings in Figure 1).
Figure 1: Relationship between cheating on taxes and claiming state benefits. 
Sources: European Value Study (2008) and author’s calculations. 
Note: growth in numbers represents a greater justification.
Recent research results in the tax payment field recognize that models like the one by 
M. Allingham and A. Sandmo lack explanatory power on some occasions. It is suggested that 
the behavioral economics theory could add more realistic factors to the classical model, like 
psychological comfort, the prestige of paying taxes, and others. Daude et al. (2012) explain 
that tax morale is based on an aspiration to be honest with the state and other taxpayers and 
a trust in the government. And on the contrary, dishonesty and distrust toward the govern-
ment are directly linked to tax evasion. For instance, a poor quality of public goods could 
be perceived by the taxpayer as dishonest behavior by the authorities and thus result in an 
unwillingness to buy public goods by avoiding tax payments. Factors behind the willingness 
to pay taxes have been investigated differently by several authors (Slemrod, Yitzhaki 2002; 
Slemrod, Weber 2012). T. O. Weber et al. (2014) claim that the main challenge in investigat-
ing tax morale is the criminal background of such an activity. Correlation is found among tax 
payment and social norms, like belonging to a social group or country, patriotism, or justice. 
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Quantitative Assessment of Tax Payment Morale
Among the number of issues that challenge the assessment of tax avoidance is the criminal 
background of such activity. As a result, a scarcity of data is common for researches in the 
field of tax payment morale (or simply “tax morale”). One of the commonly used sources are 
data from the World Values Survey (WVS) and European Values Study (EVS). These regular, 
globally performed surveys investigate their respondents’ opinions in different fields, like 
living conditions, family, religion, society, policy, economy, etc. Martinez-Vazquez and Tor-
gler (2005), Alm and Torgler (2006), Torgler and Schneider (2006), Lago-Peñas and Lago-
Peñas (2010) have used WVS and EVS data for investigating tendencies in willingness to pay 
taxes and other indicators. WVS and EVS are based on a common methodology; their data 
are thus comparable across time periods and countries. 
As a dependent variable for analysis, individual answers to the question “Cheating on 
taxes if you have a chance” are taken with possible answers varying from 1 (“never)” to 10 
(“always”). Considering that data pulled from answers are categorical variables, according to 
Gujarati (2004), a simple linear regression is not suitable, and instead a logit-probit regres-
sion model should be used. Moreover, a number of researchers in the tax morale field support 
such an approach. A summary of researches in the tax morale field (see Table 2) shows that 
the main independent variables are age, gender, religiousness, employment, marital status, 
trust in public institutions, and democracy. 
Table 2: Quantitative assessment of factors behind tax morale.
Reference
Sample and  
econometrics
Tested variables Significant variables
B. Torgler 
(2005)
Switzerland. Data 
from the ISSP. Year 
1998. Weighted orde-
red probit estimation.
Gender, age, marital status, 
education, employment sta-
tus, personal income, church 
attendance, direct democracy, 
trust in the court and legal 
system, tax rate, fine rate 
and audit probability, culture 
variables (language dummy 
variables).
Education (+)
Students and pensioners (+)
Trust in the court and legal 
system (+)
Religiousness (+)
Democracy (direct) (+) 
J. Martínez-
Vázquez, 
B. Torgler 
(2005)
Spain. Data from 
WVS and EVS. Years 
1981, 1990, 1995 and 
1999/2000. Weighted 
ordered probit esti-
mation.
Gender, age, marital status, 
employment status, religious-
ness, trust in the parliament, 
national pride, time dummy 
variables.
Tax morale is stronger in 
the 90s than in the 80s
Age and religiousness (+)
Upper-class individuals (–)
Trust in the parliament and 
national pride (+)
J. Prieto et al. 
(2006)
Spain. Data from the 
ISSP. Year 1998.
Gender, age, marital status, 
education, self-employed, so-
cial class, size of municipality 
of residence, political party 
voted for.
Age (+)
Self-employed (–)
Voters of nationwide parties 
(+)
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Reference
Sample and  
econometrics
Tested variables Significant variables
B. Torgler, F. 
G. Schneider 
(2006)
Spain, Switzerland, 
and Belgium. Data 
from the WVS 
(1995–97) and the 
EVS (1999–2000). 
Weighted ordered 
probit estimation.
Gender, age, marital status, 
education, employment status, 
social class, personal income, 
church attendance, direct de-
mocracy, national pride, trust 
in the political institutions and 
government, attitude toward 
democracy, personal income 
tax rate, fine rate and audit 
probability (for Switzerland), 
culture variables (regional and 
language dummy variables).
Cultural and regional diffe-
rences affect tax morale in 
both Switzerland and Spain
Trust in the legal system, 
government, and parlia-
ment, national pride, and 
pro-democratic attitudes (+)
Religiousness (Belgium and 
Switzerland ) (+)
Direct democracy (Switzer-
land) (+)
Women (+)
B. Torgler 
(2006)
Thirty-two world 
countries (mainly 
EU). Data from the 
WVS (1995–1997). 
Weighted ordered 
probit estimation.
Gender, age, marital status, 
education, employment sta-
tus, social class, financial 
situation, risk aversion, reli-
giousness (church attendance, 
religious education, active in 
a church group, importance of 
religion, religious guidance, 
trust in the church), corrup-
tion, trustworthiness.
Religiousness (+)
Age (+)
Risk aversion (+)
Upper-class individuals (–)
Financial satisfaction (+)
Retired, home workers, and 
part-time employed (+)
Women (+)
Married (+)
Living together (–)
Education (–)
Trustworthiness (+)
Perceived corruption (–)
J. Alm, B. 
Torgler
(2006)
USA and Spain. 
Data from the WVS. 
1999–2000. Common 
cross-country slopes 
are imposed. Weighted 
ordered probit esti-
mation.
Gender, age, marital status, 
education, employment status, 
church attendance, trust in the 
parliament, country dummy 
variables.
Tax morale is lower in 
Spain than in the USA
Age (+)
Religiousness (+)
Women (+)
Married (+)
J. Alm, B. 
Torgler 
(2006)
Sixteen EU countries. 
Data from the WVS 
(1990–93). Common 
cross-country slopes 
are imposed. Weighted 
ordered probit esti-
mation.
Gender, age, marital status, 
employment status, church 
attendance, country dummy 
variables.
Age (+)
Religiousness (+)
Self-employed (+)
Pensioners (+)
Married (+)
R. G. Cum-
mings et al. 
(2007)
Botswana (1999) and 
South Africa (2000). 
Data from Afroba-
rometer. Common 
cross-country slopes 
are imposed. Ordered 
probit estimation.
Gender, age, education, 
employment status, country 
dummy variables.
Age (+)
Source: made by the author and based on Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas (2010). 
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For researchers in the tax morale field, it is common to use dichotomous (binary) instead 
of multinomial logit-probit regressions. According to Torgler and Schneider (2006), the main 
reason behind this is a lack of dependent categorical indicators for performing a reliable 
analysis. To explain the main factors behind taxpayers’ behavior, for every combination of 
variables, at least 20% of opposite indicators should appear (the same rule is applied in other 
types of logit-probit regressions). Otherwise, the explanatory power of a model decreases 
greatly. Data received from the WVS and EVS are based on surveys, thus on the opinions 
of the respondents and not on factual data. This is especially important for tax morale rese-
arches, as the object contains criminal activity and thus the respondents may be forced to 
provide dishonest answers.
The research of tax morale factors in Baltic countries is based on WVS and EVS data. 
Data for every single country have been assessed separately by applying a dichotomous lo-
git-probit regression analysis. Ten independent variables (based on the results from earlier 
researches presented in Table 2) and one dependent variable have been taken to investigate 
the importance of different factors on tax morale for every single country. The suitability of 
the whole model (2) is assessed not by the coefficient of determination, as it is common for 
liner regressions, but by the share of classified cases. The case is assessed as classified when 
the results received by the model are the same as those collected during the survey for every 
individual response. As Gujarati (2004) suggests, more than 50% of classified cases by the 
model allow for assessing the model as suitable. 
�� �����
� = 1)
������ = 0) = ��
� � ����� � ����� � ������ � ������ � ������ � ����� � ����� � ������ � ������� � ������    (2)
where: i – country; s – survey; bn – coefficient; P – probability; C – Constanta; TM – tax mo-
rale; G – gender; A – age; MS – marital status; Ed – education; Em – employment; I – income; 
R – religiosity; CP – confidence in parliament; NP – national pride; B – acceptance of bribe. 
As one of aims of this research is to investigate the issues behind willingness to pay taxes, 
and since the author tends to apply a dichotomous instead of a multinomial logit-probit re-
gression model for every country, for the dependent variable TM, two possible outcomes are 
assigned (1 or 0). In case a respondent declared that one never cheated on taxes, the outcome 
is “1,” as this shows strong tax morale. In case the answers to the question “Cheating on taxes 
if you have a chance” range from 2 to 10, it has been assumed that a respondent’s tax morale 
is weak and the outcome is “0.” Based on this, equation (2) could be rewritten as follows (3):
������ = 1� = �
�
���� =
�
�����  (3)
where:
ݖ ൌ ܥ௦௜ ൅ ܾଵܩ௦௜ ൅ ܾଶܣ௦௜ ൅ ܾଷܯܵ௦௜ ൅ ܾସܧ݀௦௜ ൅ ܾହܧ݉௦௜ ൅ ܾ଺ܫ௦௜ ൅ ܾ଻ܴ௦௜ ൅ ଼ܾܥ ௦ܲ௜ ൅ ൅ܾଽܰ ௦ܲ௜ ൅ ܾଵ଴ܤ௦௜
Moreover, the importance of independent variables of the model is assessed by the odds 
ratio of coefficients. The odds ratio of coefficients is a specific ratio for logit-probit models 
and shows how a dependent variable (in this case, cheating on taxes if you have a chance, 
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TM) could change in case one of the independent variables will increase by 1 and all others 
remain unchanged. The odds ratio is defined as the ratio of the probability of success P(Y=1) 
and failure P(Y=0), or P(Y=1)/P(Y=0). This ratio is assumed as the main one in assessing the 
importance of independent variables to the dependent one. The value of the odds ratio could 
vary from close to 0 (in case the probability of failure is approaching to 100) and to infinity 
(in case the probability of success is approaching to 100). 
By analyzing the dependent variable, it is important to observe whether the value of the 
independent variable odds ratio is below or above 1. In case the odds ratio is 1, the probabili-
ties of success and failure are equal to 0.5. The growth of the value of an independent variable 
by 1 with the odds ratio below 1 means that the dependent variable has a higher probability 
of success (P(Y=1)) than failure (P(Y=0)). And on the contrary – the growth of the value of 
an independent variable by 1 with the odds ratio above 1 means that the dependent variable 
has a lower probability of success (P(Y=1)) than failure (P(Y=0)). In Table 3, the average of 
independent variables odds ratios are presented. More detailed parameters of all the regres-
sions are provided in the annexes for every Baltic country. 
Table 3: Odds ratios’ averages of independent variables in the dichotomous logit-probit regres-
sions.
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Estonia 0.69 0.98 0.93 1.11 1.26 1.29 1.29 2.90
Latvia 0.72 0.97 1.14 1.15 1.22 1.82
Lithuania 0.71 0.98 0.89 1.10 1.04 1.44 1.41 1.83
Source: calculated by the author.
Results of the tax morale analysis in the Baltic States suggest that the main factors behind 
weak tax payments are a wide spread of corruption, weak national pride, age, gender, and 
income (as younger, more educated individuals with higher income tend to contribute to tax 
payments less). Moreover, religiousness has a strong, direct positive link to willingness to 
pay taxes, as more religious taxpayers tend to cheat on taxes less. Based on the odds ratios, 
it could be stated that the most noticeable efforts of increasing tax morale should be directed 
at reducing the willingness to accept and give bribes, increasing confidence in Parliament 
(the Government in general) and national pride, and paying more attention to religiosity, as 
it helps to ensure tax collection. 
According to Weber et al. (2014), tax morale could be increased by signing a “taxpayers’ 
honor code,” as this would in general increase dependence on society (thus national pride). 
Trust in government and tax authority plays a noticeable role in tax morale; thus, the image 
of public institutions should find its place in the political agenda. Moreover, the quality of 
public goods is not to be considered as the least important while making decisions to pay 
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taxes or not; thus, the quality of goods, as well as quality of the institutions should be con-
stantly monitored. Weber et al. (2014) continue that public institutions with the reputation 
of a coercive mechanism should find the way to earn the reputation of high-quality service 
providers. E. F. Luttmer and M. Singhal (2014) add that cooperation between the state and 
the individual taxpayer increases tax morale as well as dependency on the group and cultural 
effects, which could lead to higher tax compliance in the long run. 
Assessment of Tax Morale Changes: A Balanced Approach  
of Social Accounting Matrixes
Using national account data, which are based on consistency in a double or quadruple entry 
system, all economic flows are merged into a coherent system and become dependent on 
each other. As a result, national accounts make it possible to make consistent assessments 
of economic developments, covering interconnections between all institutional sectors. The 
objective of national accounts is to reveal the main macroeconomic variables, their relation-
ships, and to provide more detailed information for economic analysis. It is no coincidence 
that the statistical information provided by the national accounts system is used to justify the 
political economy’s decisions and to assess the likely outcomes. 
The macroeconomic accounting of a country’s economy, rendered by social accounting 
matrixes, allows not only to calculate the main macroeconomic variables but also to evaluate 
the effects of changes in economic policy in a rather simple and understandable way. There-
fore, these tables are called social accounting matrixes; the term “social accounting matrixes” 
emerged in the 1950s, as part of the “Growth Program” led by Stone (Bos 1992). In general, 
social accounting matrixes have wide usage possibilities. For example, Pyatt and Thorbecke 
(1976) used them as a means of forecasting labor market development; they are also widely 
used by developing countries to assess income distribution, poverty rates, and employment. 
Thus, social accounting matrixes are not just a combination of macroeconomic variables that 
are useful to economic analysis – they allow solving macroeconomic and social problems.
The main aim of social accounting matrixes in term of this research is to determine the 
changes in the public sector revenue, taking into account the hypothetical changes in incomes 
accounting for households resulting from the improvement of tax morale and a more appropri-
ate declaration of incomes. The circulation of flows in the economy is structured in such a way 
as to show the income of individual institutional sectors, and it reveals the income structure and 
inter-sectorial orders of the economy (Table 4). If the matrix indicates the flows representing 
the economic situation for a specific period, the more detailed breakdown of the main account 
blocks is a useful tool for analyzing the structural and political trends in the economy (Round 
2003). Such an analysis allows assessing socioeconomic aspects, such as income level and dis-
tribution, by institutional units, the private and public use of these revenues for the acquisition 
of economic benefits (partly for living standards), payment and savings by institutional units, 
the production of economic goods, and the income of individual institutional sectors. 
When compiling social accounting matrixes, it is necessary to assess the purpose of the 
analysis. Currently, the European System of Accounts (European Commission 2013) in the 
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European Economic Area provides a solid basis for compiling social accounting matrixes, 
but the existing clauses do not allow for full coverage of social accounting matrixes. There-
fore, some assumptions need to be made, or the analysis of accuracy should be partially dis-
carded. Part of the national accounts must be presented as non-titled records, and the size of 
this part, as compared to other records, affects the quality of the analysis (see “Not assigned 
articles” in Table 4). However, there is not much of such undocumented content and, as op-
posed to all economic flows, they account for a small proportion.
Table 4. Social accounting matrix.
Expenses
Sum of 
incomeGoods  
account
Capital 
account
Non-fi- 
nancial 
compa-
nies
Public 
sector
House- 
holds
Net 
savings
Rest 
of the 
World
Activities’  
account
Not as- 
signed 
articles
Private 
sector
Public 
sector
In
co
m
e
Goods account D.3 P.3
D.2 + 
D.3
∑p1
Capital account B.2n ∑p2
Non-financial 
companies
D.4 + 
BAL.2
D.61 P.51C
D.7 + 
D.9
∑p3
Public sector D.2
D.4 + 
BAL.3
D.5
D.5 + 
D.61
D.5 D.12 D.12
D.7 + 
D.9
∑p4
Households
D.4 + 
BAL.4
D.62 + 
D.8
D.62
D.1 + 
D.62
D.11 D.11
D.7 + 
D.9
∑p5
Net savings B.9 B.9 B.9 B.9 ∑p6
Rest of the World
D.2 + 
D.4 + 
D.5 + 
BAL.5
D.1 + 
D.62
P.7
D.7 + 
D.9
∑p7
Activ-
ities’ 
account
Private 
sector
BAL.1 P.5 P.3 + P.5 P.5 P.6 BAL.6 ∑p8
Public 
sector
P.3 ∑p9
Not assigned 
articles
D.7 + 
D.9
D.7 + 
D.9
D.7 + 
D.9
D.7 + 
D.9
∑p10
SUM OF EXPENSES ∑i1 ∑i2 ∑i3 ∑i4 ∑i5 ∑i6 ∑i7 ∑i8 ∑i9 ∑i10
SUM OF INCOME ∑p1 ∑p2 ∑p3 ∑p4 ∑p5 ∑p6 ∑p7 ∑p8 ∑p9 ∑p10
BALANCE
∑p1 – 
∑i1
∑p2 – 
∑i2
∑p3 – 
∑i3
∑p4 – 
∑i4
∑p5 – 
∑i5
∑p6 – 
∑i6
∑p7 – 
∑i7
∑p8 – 
∑i8
∑p9 – 
∑i9
∑p10 – 
∑i10
NOTE: the definitions of indicators provided in the table (for example, D.3 stands for “Subsidies”; P.3 – 
for “Final consumption expenditure”; etc.) are disclosed in the “European system of accounts – ESA 
2010” (European Commission, 2013), with exception of BAL.X, as they stand for “balancing item.” 
“Balancing items” appear due to incompleteness of some national accounts, though with-out them is 
not possible to build balanced matrixes and full-fulfill the main requirement that the income of an eco-
nomy should be equal to the expenses of the same economy.
Source: made by the author, based on data of the Bank of Lithuania (2012).
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Social accounting matrixes are presented as an example in Table 4. They are created for 
three Baltic countries using national account data provided by Eurostat. Social accounting 
matrixes allow making simulations for a certain macroeconomic variable, subsequently balan-
cing it once again and suggesting balanced outcomes. Such features are very in line with the 
main aim of this research. Taking into account that tax morale is very closely interlinked with 
the shadow economy (see the tax morale quantitative assessment results above), the presump-
tion in this research is made regarding households’ willingness to receive properly accoun-
table income, which, in turn, reduces the shadow economy as a result of a better tax morale. 
The simulation modelling of social accounting matrixes is made in the following sequen-
ce. First, based on the national account data, a balanced (every column in the last row should 
be equal to 0) social accounting matrix is created for all Baltic countries. Second, an assump-
tion is made that due to a growth of tax morale, households’ demand to declare an “offici-
ally” bigger part of their wages and salaries paid by the private sector will rise (hypothetical 
growth of D.11 by 10%). This produces an imbalanced social accounting matrix, and the 
purpose of third step is to balance it, as the main requirement is that the income of an econo-
my should be equal to the expenses of the same economy in every moment. After balancing, 
new national account data are derived and, for the purpose of this research, the change of 
public sector’s (sum of row in the matrix) revenue is calculated. This shows a consistent and 
balanced estimation considering all sectors of the economy and their relations, of change not 
only in the public sector revenue but also other macroeconomic variables such as the NGDP. 
The simulation modelling of social accounting matrixes showed that the hypothetical 
formulation of the population’s requirement to pay more official wages (which indicates a 
higher willingness to pay taxes) determines not only the increase of the public sector but also 
the total revenues of the companies and the general better performance of economy. Table 
5 presents the results of a 10% simulation of households’ income increase and its impact on 
changes in public sector revenues for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in a balanced way (me-
aning all institutional sectors contributed by strongly defined linkages to the change of one 
cell with no residual remaining). 
Table 5: Change in public sector revenue (%) due to the private sector’s wages for households’ 
growth by 10%.
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
Estonia 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.7 3.5 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.3
Latvia 4.0 3.9 3.9 4.3 4.5 4.2 3.8 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.9 4.1
Lithuania 3.9 3.6 3.7 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.4
Source: calculated by the author based on national account data (Eurostat). 
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The results for Baltic countries suggest that a growth of tax morale by households would 
lead to closing the tax gap and, accordingly, the growth of public sector revenue. During the 
years of observation, a 10% of hypothetical increase in non-shadow income by households 
will contribute to a nearly 4% growth of public sector revenues. However, measures taken to 
strengthen tax morale must be applied gradually, since, in the absence of a linear relations-
hip between the tax morale and the tax gap, an excessive use of measures for strengthening 
tax morale may lead to a further increase in the tax gap (similar to the Laffer curve, which 
indicates a negative relation among the tax rate and tax revenue after some point in the rate’s 
growth). 
Conclusion
The main share of public sector revenues are made up of tax contributions. However, ration-
al economic agents tend to simultaneously avoid tax payments and consume public goods. 
Classical models concerned with the unwillingness to pay taxes are not always able to ex-
plain the factors behind weak tax morale. Thus, issues behind the gap of weak tax payment 
are filled with alternative methods suggested by tax morale researches and are assessed quan-
titatively by employing a dichotomous logit-probit regression analysis.
Results of the tax morale analysis suggest that the main factors behind weak tax payment 
are corruption and weak national pride. More efforts of national authorities while investigat-
ing tax evasion should be directed at men and taxpayers of a younger age. Additionally, more 
educated persons and those with higher income tend to evade taxes more. Also, religiousness 
has a direct strong positive link to the willingness to pay taxes. Based on the results of this 
research, it could be confirmed that the main factor under weak tax morale is corruption, 
which is additionally closely interlinked with the shadow economy and the tax payment gap. 
A systematic assessment of the factors behind weak tax payment provides guidelines for 
public authorities in the field of greater tax morale in the country, as 10% of a hypothetical 
increase in households’ income will lead to up to a 4% growth of public sector revenues. 
Different measures, like the taxpayer’s honor code, a better quality of public goods, a great-
er trust in the state, patriotism, and a sense of community should be employed in order to 
increase tax morale. After employing different measures, the public sector could expect clos-
ing the gap between the real collection of taxes and planned tax collection, thus ensuring a 
better standing of public finance and a better ability to provide goods and services. However, 
measures strengthening tax morale should be applied gradually, as they may have contrary 
effect otherwise. 
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Annexes
Table A. Results of the dichotomous logit-probit regression for Estonia.
Year of survey 1990 1996 1999 2008 2011
Independent variable Odds ratio / p value
Social-economic factors
Age 0.99 / 0.01 0.98 / 0.00 0.97 / 0.00 0.98 / 0.00 0.99 / 0.00
Employment status
Gender 0.74 / 0.06 0.57 / 0.00 0.76 / 0.03
Level of education 0.93 / 0,08
Income 1.11 / 0.00
Factors of worldview and faith
Confidence in Parliament 1.29 / 0.01
National pride 1.25 / 0.05 1.20 / 0.00 1.32 / 0.01 1.33 / 0.00 1.35 / 0.00
Religiosity 1.20 / 0.08 1.31 / 0.01
Acceptance of bribe 1.76 / 0.00 1.48 / 0.00 1.97 / 0.00 2.30 / 0.00 6.98 / 0.00
Other parameters of regressions
Classified cases, % 72.9 66.4 71.8 70.0 76.1
Number of respondents included 
in regression
695 886 621 621 1 397
Number of surveyed respondents 1 000 1 021 1 005 1 518 1 533
Distribution of opposite indica-
tors*
34.9 / 65.1 56.5 / 43.5 55.9 / 44.1 46.9 / 53.1 43.7 / 56.3
* numbers of respondents included in regressions (case of evasion / not the case of evasion).
Source: calculated by the author. 
Table B. Results of the dichotomous logit-probit regression for Latvia.
Year of survey 1990 1996 1999 2008
Independent variable Odds ratio / p value
Social-economic factors
Age 0.97 / 0.00 0.98 / 0.00 0.97 / 0.00
Employment status 1.14 / 0.01
Gender 0.72 / 0.09 0.72 / 0.03
Level of education 1.82 / 0.00
Income 1.15 / 0.03
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Factors of worldview and faith
Confidence in Parliament
National pride 1.14 / 0.01 1.22 / 0.08 1.31 / 0.01
Religiosity
Acceptance of bribe 1.51 / 0.00 1.82 / 0.00 1.98 / 0.00 1.97 / 0.00
Other parameters of regressions
Classified cases, % 71.8 71.0 70.3 75.9
Number of respondents included in regression 609 1015 637 984
Number of surveyed respondents 903 1200 1013 1506
Distribution of opposite indicators* 34.8 / 65.2 68.0 / 32.0 40.5 / 59.5 58.2 / 41.8
* numbers of respondents included in regressions (case of evasion / not the case of evasion)
Source: calculated by the author.
Table C. Results of the dichotomous logit-probit regression for Lithuania.
Year of survey 1990 1997 1999 2008
Independent variable Odds ratio / p value
Social-economic factors
Age 0.99 / 0.00 0.98 / 0.00 0.98 / 0.00 0.98 / 0.00
Employment status 1.10 / 0.03
Gender 0.68 / 0.01 0.73 / 0.04
Level of education 0.89 / 0.04
Income 1.14 / 0.01 1.10 / 0.02 0.88 / 0.00
Factors of worldview and faith
Confidence in Parliament
National pride 1.41 / 0.00 1.48 / 0.00 1.29 / 0.00 1.47 / 0.00
Religiosity 1.44 / 0.00
Acceptance of bribe 1.25 / 0.00 2.77 / 0.00 1.44 / 0.00 1.85 / 0.00
Other parameters of regressions
Classified cases, % 64.9 74.1 66.0 72.5
Number of respondents included in regression 861 721 677 978
Number of surveyed respondents 1000 1009 1018 1500
Distribution of opposite indicators* 42.2 / 57.8 53.8 / 46.2 57.6 / 42.4 62.1 / 37.9
* numbers of respondents included in regressions (case of evasion / not the case of evasion)
Source: author’s calculations.
